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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and JUANITA LEWIS JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
No. 6305 
DEVINE, HOWELL & STINE and 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD, 
Plaintiff's Attorneys. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and JUANITA LEWIS JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
No. 6305 
In view of the fact that defendants apparently fail to 
comprehend the position taken by the plaintiff in this matter, 
we feel constrained to file this reply to defendants' brief to the 
end that there may be no doubt as to just what plaintiff is 
contending. 
We do not urge that the average daily operation of 
plaintiff's business during the year next preceding the injury, 
or for any other period, is the basis for determining what is 
"usual operation." What we do urge is that the Commission 
must find from the evidence before it what is the usual opera-
tion, and in making that finding, all of the competent evidence 
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must be considered. Here the parties entered into a stipulation 
showing the operation of plantiff's business over a period of 
fifty-four weeks prior to the injury. It is by reason of this 
showing of the fifty-four week operation that we say that the 
Commission must use the same as the basis in making its 
determination as to what was plaintiff's usual operation. Had 
the evidence before the Commission been limited to a showing 
of the operation for but a four week period, or a one week 
period, or a six month period, or a five year period, we would 
say that the determination of plaintiff's usual operation must 
be based upon that evidence, and that the Commission would 
not be justified in basing it upon anything other than all of 
the evidence before the Commission in that regard. Here the 
evidence disclosed the operation over a fifty-four week period. 
The Commission is not justified in disregarding that evidence 
and basing its determination upon the operation of the busi-
ness at the time of the injury. 
Nor do we urge, as suggested by defendants, that plain-
tiff's usual operation consists of the average weekly operation 
over this fifty-four week period, which average weekly opera-
tion is approximately 5.69 days per week. All we urge is that 
the evidence relates to a fifty-four week period-that during 
such fifty-four week period, plaintiff's business consisted of 
19 five day weeks, 16 five and one-half day weeks, 11 six day 
weeks, and 8 seven day weeks; that it is apparent upon the 
face of this evidence that the usual operation of plaintiff's 
business was not seven days per week, but, on the contrary, 
was six days or less per week. Had the evidence disclosed 
simply that for a period of six weeks prior to the injury, 
plaintiff's business had been operating seven days per week, 
we would then agree with the Commission that upon the 
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evidence, the usual operation of plaintiff's business was seven 
days per week. But here, the evidence discloses that plaintiff 
had forty-six weeks of six days or less per week, as compared 
to eight ·weeks of seven days. The only finding that can be 
made from that evidence is that the usual operation of 
plaintiff's business was six days or less per week. 
Defendants, however, argue that the evidence discloses 
that seven days per week was a usual operation of plaintiff's 
business for this season of the year. This assertion is made 
with absolutely no evidence to support it, and directly in the 
teeth of the uncontradicted evidence. The deceased was 
injured on October 13, 1939. The evidence shows that at this 
season of the preceding year, plaintiff's business operated but 
50 days per week. We specifically direct the Court's atten-
tion to the stipulation which shows that during the week 
ending October 8, 1938, plaintiff's business operated but 50 
days a week, and that during the week ending October 15, 
1938, plaintiff's business operated but 50 days per week, and 
that it was not until the week ending July 8, 1939, that plain-
tiff's business operated for more than six days per week. To 
now assert that seven days per week was the usual operation 
of plaintiff's business for this season of the year is to do so 
with absolutely no evidence to support it, and in the face of 
the uncontradicted evidence. 
Defendants further apparently take the position that it 
is the number of days per week that the injured is employed 
at the time of his injury that controls as to which formula is 
to be used. That is, if he is in fact working seven days per 
week when injured, his compensation should be based upon 
seven day employment per week. This is evidenced by the 
following appearing at page 4 of the defendants' brief: 
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"'fo take another example: Suppose Mr. Johnson had 
been employed only a week or two before he was fat-
ally injured. If plaintiff's contention is to prevail, his 
compensation would not be fixed by the weekly wage 
he actually received when injured, but by the average 
number of days per week that the plaintiff had been 
operating the preceding year. There is no language 
in the act which justifies such conclusion." 
It is not apparent why the defendants inject the matter of 
weekly wage into the foregoing, because, so far as plaintiff 
is concerned, there is no question with respect thereto. The 
only question is whether the formula for seven day employ-
ment per week or whether the formula for five and one-half or 
six da-y employment per week shall be used. We do not, and 
never have, disputed that the wage at the time of the injury 
is the wage to be considered, but it does not follow therefrom 
thcit the number of days per week of operation at the time of 
injury is controlling. The statutes are specific on this. As to 
weekly wage, the statute provides: 
"The weekly wage of the injured person at the time 
of injury shall be taken as the basis upon which to 
compute benefits." 
There is no similar provision with respect to determining 
employment per week. On the contrary, the statute provides 
that five and one-half, six, or seven day employment per week 
shall be based upon the "usual operation" of plaintiff's busi-
ness. It is significant that these two matters are dealt with 
by the legislature in the same-paragraph of the statute (Section 
42-1-70, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as am~nded by 
Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937; page 8 of plaintiff's brief). 
With reSpect to weekly wage, the legislature provided that the 
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time of the injury should govern, while as to the number of 
days employment per week it provided that the usual operation 
of the business should govern. With this in mind, it is im-
possible to conceive that the legislature intended the same rule 
to govern, else there would have been no occasion to make any 
distinction as to the wage and the weekly period of employ-
ment; indeed, the word "usual" might as well have been 
omitted. Had the legislature not meant "usual" operation, it 
certainly would not have used that word. And the fact that 
the deceased was working seven days per week at the time 
of the injury certainly does not establish that seven days per 
week constituted plaintiff's usual operation. 
'Ve heartily agree with defendants' statement near the 
bottom of page 4 of their brief that the length of the deceased's 
employment by plaintiff is immaterial in determining whether 
the employment is five and one-half, six or seven day employ-
ment per week. Whether the employee has been employed 
but a week, a year, or ten years, it is still necessary to deter-
mine the usual operation of the employer's business. The 
length of time the individual has been employed therein, is 
absolutely immaterial. The amount of compensation to which 
an injured employee is entitled, or his dependents in the event 
of his death, is neither increased nor reduced by length of 
service. 
It leads us nowhere to pose hypothetical situations as 
defendants do on page 4 of their brief, wherein they "Suppose 
a business operates seven days per week for only one month 
a year and is closed down during the remainder of the year"; 
or "Also, if a business is operated only one week of seven days 
during a given year * * * ." The answer to such suppositions 
must be the same as in the case before us. The formpla to 
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be used in determining compensation must be the one in 
accord with the "usual operation" of the employer's business. 
The writer is frank to state that he would have considerable 
difficulty in finding that a business that operates but one week 
a year, and during that week for seven days, is a business that 
"usually operates" seven days per week. The obvious answer 
is that such a business does not "usually" operate seven days 
a week. The same difficulty would be encountered with a 
business that has fifty-one five day weeks and one seven day 
week. It would take a considerable stretch of the imagination 
to hold that such business usually operates seven days per 
week. 
Defendants have continuously throughout their brief re-
ferred to the question of weekly wage, and assumed that some 
question involving the same was raised by these proceedings. 
At page 4 of their brief, they say: 
"Also, if a business is operated only one week of seven 
days during a given year, it may not be successfully 
maintained that a person who is injured or killed dur-
ing that week shall be entitled to compensation on the 
basis of 1/52nd of his actual weekly wage." 
The writer does not know who is seeking to maintain such a 
proposition. Certainly not the plaintiff. We agree that the 
weekly wage at the time of the injury is to be used as the 
basis; not 1/52nd thereof, nor any other fraction. But the 
question of days of employment per week is something entirely 
different. That depends on the usual operation of the employ-
er's business, not upon a factual situation at the time of the 
injury. 
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The defendants further assert: 
"The case of 1\'lorrison-Merrill Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 81 Utah 363; 18 P. (2d) 295, lends support 
to defendants' contention." 
If defendants' contention is that the weekly wage as of the 
date of the injury is to be used in determining compensation, 
plaintiff agrees therewith, because such case specifically so 
holds. On the contrary, if defendants' contention is that the 
Commission was right in using the formula for seven day 
employment in determining benefits, then plaintiff denies that 
such case supports in any wise such contention, because that 
matter is not considered by the Court in that case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEVINE, HOWELL & STINE and 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD, 
Plaintiff's Attorneys. 
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